Chandra Asri Pacific (TPIA): One Day Up 12%, The Next Day Down 13% — Here’s What’s Really Going On

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FIRST, THE HEADLINE: THE THESIS HELD

On 6 June, TPIA closed at IDR 1,305. The market was in freefall, the rupiah was at a record low, and MSCI was three weeks away from a decision that could have reclassified the entire Indonesian stock market.

The stock bottomed at IDR 1,205 shortly after. Today it trades at IDR 2,060 — a 71% recovery from the low.

If you followed the guidance in the June update — hold above IDR 1,000, do not add before 23 June, and do not panic-sell into the bottom — you are now sitting in profit rather than having crystallised a 30% loss at the worst possible moment. That is the entire value of having a plan before the panic rather than during it.

Now let me walk through what actually changed.

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1. MSCI KEPT INDONESIA IN EMERGING MARKETS (23 JUNE)

This was the binary event, and it resolved in the market's favour.

MSCI maintained Indonesia's Emerging Market classification in its 2026 Market Classification Review. The catastrophic Frontier Market scenario — which would have forced tens of billions of dollars of passive outflows — did not happen.

But read the fine print, because this is not a clean all-clear. MSCI explicitly flagged concerns about shareholder transparency and suspected coordinated trading in the Indonesian market, stating that both issues materially limit investors' ability to assess true free float and to trust observed market prices as a basis for index replication. MSCI acknowledged the reform package announced by OJK, IDX, and KSEI — enhanced disclosure of shareholders above 1%, a High Shareholding Concentration framework, and a roadmap to lift the minimum free float requirement to 15% — but stressed that what matters is consistent implementation, not announcements.

The critical line: if sufficient progress is not evident by the November 2026 MSCI Index Review, MSCI will consider a range of options for Indonesia, potentially including a consultation on reclassification to Frontier Market.

In the Global Market Accessibility Review released five days earlier, MSCI also downgraded Indonesia's "Information Flow" rating from positive to negative — a formal yellow card.

Translation: the gun was lowered, not unloaded. November is the new June.

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2. TPIA SOLVED ITS OWN FREE FLOAT PROBLEM — DECISIVELY

This is the single most underappreciated development of the past two months, and it is specific to TPIA rather than the market.

Remember why TPIA was ejected from the MSCI Global Standard Index in the first place: its free float was too small. SCG's forced divestiture, painful as it was in early June, mechanically fixed that problem.

On 4 August, management confirmed the company's free float now stands at 25.7%. That figure clears every relevant threshold at once:

- Above the 15% minimum required by both IDX and MSCI
- Above the 20% benchmark used in MSCI index management
- Above the 25% threshold associated with potential full inclusion in MSCI indices

TPIA was also promoted from the Development Board to the Main Board (Papan Utama) of the IDX in late May.

The structural defect that caused the crash has been repaired. That does not guarantee MSCI re-inclusion — but it removes the specific disqualifier, and re-inclusion at a materially higher free float would be a significant catalyst rather than a remote hope.

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3. H1 2026 RESULTS: READ THIS CAREFULLY, THE HEADLINE IS MISLEADING

Chandra Asri reported first-half results on 29 July. The headlines split into two camps: "revenue soars 83.6%" and "net profit collapses 77%." Both are true, and neither tells you much on its own.

The actual numbers, H1 2026:
- Revenue: USD 5.35 billion, up 83.6%
- Energy segment: USD 3.33 billion, up 184.4%
- Chemicals segment: USD 1.96 billion, up 16.0%
- Infrastructure segment: USD 64.6 million, up 13.9%
- Operational EBITDA: USD 802.6 million, down from USD 1.76 billion a year earlier
- Net profit: USD 371.2 million (~IDR 6.71 trillion), down 77.2%
- Cash + marketable securities: USD 3.9 billion

Why the profit "collapse" is not what it looks like: H1 2025 included an enormous one-off accounting gain from the Aster acquisition — the bargain-purchase gain booked when TPIA consolidated Shell's Singapore refinery. That gain is not repeatable and was never operating income. Management stated explicitly that excluding the non-recurring Aster gains from the H1 2025 base, core operational and financial performance continued to show strong growth.

What the underlying business actually did: backing out Q1 from the half-year gives you Q2 2026 in isolation — roughly USD 2.95 billion revenue, USD 382 million EBITDA, and USD 166 million net profit. That is a slight sequential step down from Q1's record quarter, but it is a genuinely profitable quarter in the trough of the worst global petrochemical cycle in decades. Two years ago this company was posting losses.

The balance sheet is the quiet story: USD 3.9 billion in cash and marketable securities. This is no longer a company that can be broken by a refinancing window.

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4. THREE GROWTH PROJECTS MOVED FORWARD

The pipeline is not a slide deck any more. It is under construction with dates attached.

CA-EDC (Cilegon): now 72% complete, up from 60% at the time of my original report. Still targeted for commercial operations in 2027. This is the caustic soda and ethylene dichloride plant serving a domestic market Indonesia currently imports entirely.

Condensate Splitter Unit and Single Buoy Mooring revitalisation (Pulau Bukom, Singapore): on schedule to begin operations in Q4 2026 — this year. Management projects these two facilities alone will add approximately USD 20 million per month in EBITDA. That is roughly USD 240 million annualised, arriving within five months.

C2 export expansion: the company has taken Final Investment Decision on an USD 80 million project to increase export capacity and deepen supply chain integration.

The Q4 2026 EBITDA step-up from Bukom is the nearest-term hard catalyst and, in my view, the one the market is least focused on.

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5. VALUATION RATIOS: WHAT TPIA ACTUALLY COSTS, AND HOW THAT COMPARES

This is the section a reader asked me to add, and it needs a warning label before the numbers start.

Why P/E and P/BV break down for this particular company:

First, the earnings base is unstable by construction. Petrochemicals is a deeply cyclical industry. TPIA lost money in 2022, 2023, and 2024, and then earned USD 1.1 billion in 2025. A P/E calculated on trough earnings looks absurdly expensive; a P/E on peak earnings looks absurdly cheap. Neither tells you what the business is worth.

Second, half the company is a 50/50 joint venture. Aster Chemicals and Energy — which owns the Singapore refinery and is now the largest single driver of group revenue — is a 50/50 JV with Glencore. It is fully consolidated in TPIA's revenue and EBITDA lines, but half its equity belongs to Glencore and sits as non-controlling interest. CDIA, the infrastructure subsidiary, is 60%-owned with the same effect. This means TPIA's book value attributable to shareholders is far smaller than the balance sheet total, and P/BV figures vary enormously depending on which equity number a data provider uses. Treat any single published P/BV for TPIA with real suspicion.

Third, the company you are valuing did not exist eighteen months ago. Any trailing-twelve-month ratio spans two structurally different businesses. Trailing data is not just stale here — it is describing a different company.

TPIA's key ratios at IDR 2,060 (annualised H1 2026 figures, confidence noted):

- Market capitalisation: ~IDR 178 trillion / ~USD 9.9 billion [Verified]
- P/E, annualised H1 2026: ~13.3x [Likely]
- P/E, trailing FY2025: ~9x [Likely — flattered by one-off Aster gain, ignore this number]
- EV/EBITDA: ~6.8x [Likely]
- Market cap / EBITDA: ~6.2x [Likely]
- EV/Sales: ~1.0x [Likely — this is the one that looks expensive]
- P/BV: 2.5x to 4.7x [Guessing — range reflects attributable vs total equity ambiguity]
- Net Debt / EBITDA: ~0.7x [Likely — genuinely strong for a leveraged cyclical]
- EBITDA margin: 15.0% [Verified]
- Net margin: 6.9% [Verified]
- Dividend yield: ~0.7% [Verified — this is not an income stock]
- Cash + securities: USD 3.9 billion, roughly 40% of market cap [Verified]

The one number that should give you pause is EV/Sales at roughly 1.0x. Most integrated refiners and commodity chemical producers trade at 0.3x to 0.7x sales, because refining is a high-revenue, thin-margin business. TPIA trading at around 1.0x sales says the market is already crediting the company for margin expansion it has not yet delivered on a full-year basis. That is the strongest argument against buying more here.

The one number that should reassure you is Net Debt / EBITDA at roughly 0.7x. For a company that spent over USD 2 billion on acquisitions in eighteen months, that is a conservative balance sheet. Most of the market spent June assuming TPIA was over-levered. It is not. USD 3.9 billion in cash against a USD 9.9 billion market cap means roughly 40% of what you are paying is covered by liquid assets.

INDONESIAN PEERS

Indonesia has almost no true comparables for TPIA, which is itself part of the investment case.

Barito Pacific (BRPT) is the closest comparison, and the numbers tell a story. BRPT is the parent holding company that owns TPIA plus Star Energy/BREN (geothermal). BRPT reported H1 2026 revenue of USD 5.69 billion with profit of USD 518.44 million, down 69.92% year-on-year — the same pattern as TPIA, for the same reason, driven by the same underlying assets. BRPT trades around IDR 1,675 to 1,690.

The useful insight: BRPT is a holding-company route to the same underlying assets, plus geothermal exposure. Holding companies typically trade at a discount to the sum of their parts. If you believe in the Aster refinery and Esso integration story, BRPT is worth checking as an alternative expression of the same trade — with the trade-off that you also inherit BREN's own valuation risk.

Lotte Chemical Titan (FPNI), trading around IDR 372, is a fundamentally different business — a downstream polyolefins converter without a cracker, refinery, or infrastructure arm. Not a real valuation comparable.

Verdict on Indonesian comps: there is no domestic peer group. Anyone quoting an "Indonesian petrochemical sector average P/E" is averaging across businesses that do different things at different points in the value chain. This is precisely why TPIA's valuation is so contested domestically — and why analyst targets on this name span from IDR 1,090 to IDR 6,200.

REGIONAL ASIAN PEERS

This is where the comparison becomes genuinely useful, because these companies do what TPIA does.

PTT Global Chemical, Thailand, market cap roughly USD 5.0 billion — trading at roughly 0.35x P/BV. This is Thailand's largest ethane-based petrochemical producer and the closest structural analogue to TPIA in the region — a refinery-plus-cracker integrated player. DBS maintains a "Fully Valued" rating with a target based on 0.35x P/BV, two standard deviations below its five-year average. PTTGC has trailing twelve month revenue of USD 15.5 billion against a market cap of just USD 5.02 billion — a price-to-sales ratio of roughly 0.32x.

Read that again: a company with 45% more revenue than TPIA trades at half TPIA's market capitalisation.

Why the gap exists, and whether it is justified: PTTGC is in a mature, low-growth market with no import-substitution runway. TPIA has CA-EDC entering a market Indonesia currently imports entirely, a Q4 2026 Bukom EBITDA step-up, and a domestic economy growing above 5%. Some premium is defensible. Three times the price-to-sales multiple is a large premium to defend.

Petronas Chemicals, Malaysia, market cap roughly MYR 27.4 billion — trading at 35.2x 2026 estimated P/E, and 0.63x 2026 estimated EV/Sales. Malaysia's gas-advantaged producer, structurally lower-cost than a naphtha cracker, swung to a loss exceeding MYR 1 billion in a recent quarter and now trades at 35x forward earnings on depressed profits. This is what the trough of this cycle does even to companies with better feedstock economics than TPIA. It is a reminder that low-cost position does not immunise you against the cycle.

DBS's regional outlook matters for TPIA directly: they expect a prolonged chemical trough through 2026-27, with additional polyethylene capacity growth in China peaking at 6-7% in 2027, plus at least 51 million tonnes of additional US ethane supply entering the market between 2025 and 2030. That ethane supply is a structural threat to every naphtha cracker in Asia, TPIA included.

GLOBAL BENCHMARKS

LyondellBasell, market cap roughly USD 20.8 billion, trailing twelve month revenue roughly USD 29.7 billion — price-to-sales around 0.70x, ten-year median EV/EBITDA of 7.09x.

LyondellBasell is the single most useful global benchmark, because its ten-year median EV/EBITDA of 7.09x gives you a through-cycle anchor for what a large integrated polyolefins business is worth across a full cycle. LYB's range over the past decade runs from 4.23x at the bottom to 57.99x at the top — a numerical illustration of why EV/EBITDA on a single year is unreliable in this industry.

TPIA at roughly 6.8x EV/EBITDA sits just below LYB's through-cycle median. On this measure specifically, TPIA is not expensive.

The wider global chemicals industry median EV/EBITDA currently sits around 14x — but that figure is inflated by sector-wide depressed EBITDA rather than by genuine optimism, so it flatters TPIA and should be discounted.

Two useful LYB data points for framing the cycle: Wells Fargo upgraded LYB to Overweight with a target based on approximately 6.5x 2026 EV/EBITDA and an adjusted EBITDA outlook of USD 6.5 billion, up 156% year-on-year. A well-resourced US analyst applying a 6.5x forward multiple to a global leader is a reasonable ceiling reference for what TPIA should command. Separately, LYB cut its quarterly dividend from USD 1.25 to USD 0.69 in February 2026, taking the yield from roughly 10% down to 3.5% and freeing up USD 1.8 billion of annual cash flow. When the global leader cuts its dividend to fund capex, that tells you where the industry is in the cycle.

Also worth noting: BofA's valuation framework for Westlake Chemical uses 6.0x EBITDA for the commodity franchise versus 11x for the building products business. The market pays roughly 6x for commodity chemical earnings and roughly 11x for specialty or infrastructure-like earnings.

This is the strongest structural argument in TPIA's favour, and it is not yet in the price. TPIA's infrastructure arm, CDIA — ports, tanks, jetties, power, water — is contracted, recurring, infrastructure-like revenue that deserves a double-digit multiple, not a 6x commodity multiple. It is currently small at USD 64.6 million in H1 revenue, but it grew 13.9% and is expanding. If CDIA scales, a sum-of-the-parts valuation applying differentiated multiples produces a materially higher fair value than a blended group EV/EBITDA does.

THE RATIO VERDICT, SUMMARISED

- EV/EBITDA versus LyondellBasell's through-cycle median: 6.8x versus 7.09x — fair to cheap
- Net Debt / EBITDA: 0.7x — strong
- Cash as a percentage of market cap: roughly 40% — strong
- P/E on annualised H1: 13.3x — fair
- EV/Sales versus regional peers: 1.0x versus 0.32x to 0.63x — expensive
- P/BV versus PTTGC: 2.5x to 4.7x versus 0.35x — very expensive
- Dividend yield: 0.7% — weak

Where that leaves the stock: on cash-flow and balance-sheet measures, TPIA is reasonably valued to cheap. On asset and revenue measures, it is materially more expensive than every regional peer.

Those two facts are not contradictory. The market is paying a premium for TPIA's margin and growth pipeline rather than for its assets. That is a defensible position if the Bukom EBITDA step-up lands in Q4 2026 and CA-EDC delivers in 2027. It is an expensive position if either project slips or if the chemical cycle stays in the trough through 2028 as DBS expects.

Practically: these ratios support holding an existing position and argue against aggressively adding at IDR 2,060. The premium to regional peers means you are no longer being paid to take the risk the way you were at IDR 1,300. If you want to build a position, wait for either a pullback toward IDR 1,800 or hard confirmation that Bukom is running.

The single number to watch: if annualised EBITDA moves from USD 1.6 billion toward USD 1.85 billion once Bukom contributes its projected USD 20 million per month, then at an unchanged share price the EV/EBITDA multiple compresses from roughly 6.8x to roughly 5.9x. That is the mechanism by which this stock gets cheaper without falling — and it is the core of the bull case from here.

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6. THE MARKET BACKDROP HAS IMPROVED — BUT NOT HEALED

IHSG: closed at 6,319 on 4 August after gaining 6.13% in July, its strongest month of 2026. But the index remains down roughly 27.9% year-to-date. The recovery is real and the damage is also real.

Rupiah: stabilised in the IDR 17,925 to 18,030 range. Better than the June panic, still historically weak.

Bank Indonesia: the BI Rate now sits at 5.75%, after 100 basis points of hikes during 2026 — 50bp in May, then 25bp each in June — held steady at the July meeting. BI is running an explicitly pro-stability policy aimed at defending the currency and pulling foreign portfolio flows back in. High rates mean a high discount rate on equities; this is a headwind that has not gone away.

Growth: Q2 2026 GDP came in at 5.29%, slower than Q1's 5.61% but comfortably ahead of the 5.1% consensus.

Inflation: 3.34% in June, easing to 2.88% in July — back inside BI's 2.5% plus or minus 1% target band.

Two domestic events to watch this month: the appointment of the new Bank Indonesia Governor, and the Nota Keuangan / RAPBN 2027 budget presentation.

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IF YOU ARE ALREADY HOLDING (ENTRY AROUND IDR 1,770)

You are up approximately 16%. At the June low you were down 32%. Same position, same company, nine weeks apart.

My recommendation: continue to hold. Raise your stop to IDR 1,750 — around your entry — so the position cannot turn back into a loss.

The reasoning: the reason to hold has changed from "the selling is technical, the fundamentals are fine" to something stronger. The free float defect is fixed. The SCG overhang is gone. The MSCI existential risk is deferred. There is a hard, dated EBITDA catalyst in Q4 2026 worth roughly USD 20 million a month. And now that we have looked at valuation properly, TPIA is fairly priced to cheap on cash-flow metrics even after the 71% recovery.

I am not recommending you add here. The stock has already run 71% off the low, it is trading near technical resistance, it is expensive versus regional peers on revenue and book value measures, and the November MSCI review is a live risk that has not been resolved. Buying strength after a vertical recovery, ahead of an unresolved binary event, is a worse trade than holding a position you already own at a good average price.

If the stock consolidates back toward IDR 1,800 to 1,900 without any deterioration in the fundamental picture, that would be a reasonable place to add.

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IF YOU HAVE NOT YET BOUGHT (NEW READERS)

The easy money in this trade has been made. That does not mean the trade is over — it means the risk and reward is now ordinary rather than extraordinary.

The case for buying at IDR 2,060: market capitalisation of roughly IDR 178 trillion against annualised operational EBITDA of approximately USD 1.6 billion. USD 3.9 billion of cash on the balance sheet. Free float above the MSCI full-inclusion threshold. A Q4 2026 EBITDA catalyst and a 2027 CA-EDC catalyst, both under construction and on schedule. And on the cleanest cross-cycle valuation measure — EV/EBITDA against LyondellBasell's ten-year median — TPIA is not expensive.

The case for waiting: the November MSCI review is unresolved and Indonesia is on formal notice. The global petrochemical cycle has not turned — management itself continues to describe 2026 conditions as very challenging, citing global oversupply, aggressive price competition, and Chinese economic softness. Hormuz tensions remain a live threat to feedstock supply. TPIA trades at a large premium to Thai and Malaysian peers on revenue and book value measures. And analyst price targets on this name span an absurd range, from around IDR 1,090 to IDR 6,200, which tells you the professional community has no consensus whatsoever on what this business is worth.

Suggested approach: if you want exposure, start with 1 to 2 percent of portfolio and be willing to add on weakness toward IDR 1,800 rather than chasing strength above IDR 2,200. Set a stop at IDR 1,700. Do not build a full position ahead of the November MSCI review.

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WHAT I GOT RIGHT, AND WHAT I GOT WRONG

Right: the core call that the June selling was structural rather than fundamental, and that panic-selling at the bottom would be the wrong move. The insider buying signal — a TPIA director buying IDR 8.2 billion of stock at IDR 1,780 to 1,890 in early June — turned out to be a good tell.

Wrong: my stop-loss levels. I set IDR 1,600, then IDR 1,500, then IDR 1,000. The first two were both broken, and the stock bottomed at IDR 1,205. Anyone who mechanically executed the first two stops would have sold near the low and missed the entire recovery. That is a real failure of calibration on my part: in a forced-seller liquidation, ordinary technical stop levels are close to meaningless, because the seller is price-insensitive. I should have identified that dynamic and set the stop far wider from the start, or used position sizing rather than stops as the primary risk control.

Worth saying plainly, because the lesson generalises: when you know the seller is a known, finite, price-insensitive block, stops based on chart levels will take you out at the worst price. Size the position so you can survive the liquidation instead.

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DATES TO WATCH

- August 2026: New Bank Indonesia Governor appointment; Nota Keuangan / RAPBN 2027
- Q4 2026: Bukom CSU and SBM operational — approximately USD 20 million per month EBITDA step-up
- November 2026: MSCI Index Review — the deferred Indonesia decision
- 2027: CA-EDC commercial operations

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THE ONE-SENTENCE SUMMARY

TPIA has recovered 71% off its June low, fixed the free float defect that caused the crash, cleared the MSCI existential risk until November, trades fairly on cash-flow terms but at a real premium to regional peers on asset terms, and has a dated EBITDA catalyst arriving in Q4 — the easy asymmetry is gone, but the position is now a hold on merit rather than a hold on hope.

This is not financial advice. Do your own research. All investments carry risk, including total loss of capital.

The Mystery of the Crash Is Now Solved
The question everyone was asking all week: why did TPIA keep falling even after the MSCI removal was supposedly done? We now have the answer.
SCG Chemicals — Thailand's largest petrochemical company and TPIA's second-largest shareholder with 30.57% — sold 12.86 billion shares between June 2 and June 5. Total value: IDR 14.1 trillion. Their stake is now halved to 15.71%.
The final leg happened on Friday, June 5: a mysterious IDR 8.8 trillion block trade in the negotiation market — 9.14 billion shares changing hands at IDR 962 per share, a 38% discount to the market price at the time. Analyst Theodorus Melvin from Stockbit identified this as SCG's final divestiture tranche within hours.

This explains the entire week's price action. The IHSG was also collapsing at the same time — but the disproportionate fall in TPIA was SCG dumping roughly 15% of all outstanding shares into the market over four trading days. That selling is now done. SCG is out of their first tranche.
The overhang that crashed the stock this week no longer exists.

The Question Nobody Can Answer Yet (And It Matters Enormously)
Who bought the 9.14 billion shares at IDR 962?
No official disclosure yet. The buyer acquired roughly 10.6% of the entire company at a price 26% below where the stock closed on Friday. Possibilities include a sovereign wealth fund (Danantara?), a strategic industrial buyer, or a large international value investor.
When the buyer's identity is disclosed — likely next week through mandatory IDX reporting — it will be the single most important piece of news for TPIA's trajectory. A strategic or sovereign buyer at that scale would be a significant re-rating catalyst.

What to Expect Next Week
Monday opening: Expect volatility. The IHSG closed at 5,594 on Friday — its lowest in over five years, down 37% from its January 2026 high. The rupiah is at IDR 18,025/USD. The market is in a genuine crisis, not just a correction.
The government is moving. President Prabowo visited the Danantara offices on June 4. Market stabilization measures — including potential Danantara bond issuance and OJK intervention — are being discussed. Any concrete announcement would be a positive shock.
Bank Indonesia may call an emergency meeting if the rupiah continues to deteriorate past IDR 18,500. Any rate cut or large-scale intervention would be a signal.
The two dates that matter most:

June 18 — MSCI Global Market Accessibility Review. A preliminary signal on Indonesia's EM status.
June 23 — MSCI Annual Market Classification Review. The full decision. This remains the binary risk I have flagged since last week.

The market is pricing in a significant probability of a Frontier Market reclassification. If MSCI instead maintains EM status, the relief rally across Indonesian equities — including TPIA — would be substantial. If they proceed with reclassification, the damage to the entire IDX would be severe.

If You Are Already Holding (Entry Around IDR 1,770)
You are down approximately 26%. I will not pretend otherwise.
The original stop-loss levels I suggested (IDR 1,600, then IDR 1,500) were both broken. By the rules of risk management, those triggers should have meant an exit. That opportunity has passed.
Here is where we stand now:
The fundamental case is stronger than ever. At IDR 1,305, TPIA trades at approximately 4.6x EV/EBITDA on its record Q1 2026 earnings — one of the cheapest valuations for an integrated energy and chemicals company anywhere in Asia. JP Morgan, which upgraded TPIA to Neutral on June 1, has a 12-month target of IDR 1,750 — a 34% return from current levels. The company's own director bought IDR 8.2 billion worth of shares on June 3 at prices between IDR 1,780 and IDR 1,890. He paid more than you did.
The technical case improved meaningfully on Friday. SCG's divestiture completing removes the single largest structural seller from the stock. The unknown buyer who paid IDR 962 for 10.6% of the company is deeply motivated to see this stock recover.
My recommendation: Hold. Set your absolute floor at IDR 1,000. If the stock breaks IDR 1,000, something has gone structurally wrong beyond normal market panic and you should exit. Above IDR 1,000, the odds of recovery to at least IDR 1,600–1,750 (JP Morgan target) over the next three to six months are meaningful.
Do not average down before June 23. After June 23, if MSCI maintains EM status, you should seriously consider adding.

If You Have Not Yet Bought (New Readers)
You are looking at IDR 1,305 for a company generating USD 421 million in EBITDA per quarter, with a 237,000 barrel-per-day refinery in Singapore, Indonesia's only naphtha cracker, and a USD 800 million growth plant 60% complete. The valuation is, by any rational measure, extremely cheap.
You are also looking at a market in freefall, a currency at all-time lows, and a binary event risk on June 23 that could trigger another 30-40% downside.
My suggested approach:
If you want exposure: buy a 1% portfolio position now at IDR 1,300–1,350. Small enough that even a 50% further decline does not destroy your portfolio, but enough that a recovery to IDR 2,000+ generates a meaningful return.
Then wait for June 23. If MSCI maintains EM status: buy another 2–3% aggressively. If MSCI announces a Frontier reclassification: do not add under any circumstances.
The risk/reward from IDR 1,305 is genuinely asymmetric if you believe Indonesia will not be reclassified. That is a judgment call only you can make.

The One-Sentence Summary for This Week
The crash was real, the pain was real — but the reason for the crash (SCG dumping 15% of TPIA's shares into a panicking market) is now over, and whoever bought 10.6% of this company at IDR 962 on Friday knows something worth watching.

This is not financial advice. Do your own research. All investments carry risk, including total loss of capital.